

## Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NATO 02811

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1  
TAGS: PFOR, NATO, MNUC, NPG  
SUBJECT: NPG: DRAFT PERMREPS REPORT ON TECHNOLOGY STUDY

REF: (A) USNATO 2412 (DTG 261205Z APR 77), (B) STATE  
99502 (DTG 030010Z MAY 77), USNATO 2468 (DTG 281037Z  
APR 77)

SUMMARY: AT MEETINGS ON MAY 3 AND 5, THE NPG STAFF GROUP  
PREPARED A REVISED DRAFT PERMREPS REPORT ON THE NPG  
TECHNOLOGY STUDY WHICH TAKES ACCOUNT OF WASHINGTON  
GUIDANCE (REF B). THE UK DELEGATION INFORMED US PRIOR  
TO THE STAFF GROUP MEETINGS THAT THEY SUPPORTED THE US  
APPROACH TO SECTION IV OF THE REPORT ON FOLLOW-ON WORK,  
AND ALSO THAT THEY EXPECTED LONDON TO MAKE AN INITIATIVE,  
PRINCIPALLY AT THE DPC MINISTERIAL, ON A NEW STUDY OF  
CONVENTIONAL TECHNOLOGY AS INDICATED IN REF B. THE  
STAFF GROUP WILL DISCUSS THE REVISED DRAFT REPORT ON  
MAY 13, WITH A VIEW TOWARD AGREEING ON A FORMAL DRAFT  
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FOR REVIEW AND APPROVAL AT THE MAY 23 NPG PERMREPS  
MEETING. ACTION REQUESTED. WASHINGTON COMMENTS ON THE  
REVISED DRAFT PERMREPS REPORT IN PARA 3 BELOW PRIOR TO  
MAY 13. END SUMMARY.

1. THERE FOLLOWS IN PARA 3 BELOW THE REVISED DRAFT  
PERMREPS REPORT ON THE NPG TECHNOLOGY STUDY PREPARED

BY THE NPG STAFF GROUP ON MAY 3 AND 5. IN THE STAFF GROUP DISCUSSIONS, US REP (WOODWORTH) INTRODUCED MODIFICATIONS TO THE INITIAL DRAFT REPORT (REF A), IN ACCORD WITH WASHINGTON GUIDANCE (REF B) AND MISSION COMMENTS (REF C). THE MODIFICATIONS WERE ACCEPTED BY ALLIED REPS ON AN AD REFERUNDUM BASIS. WHILE SEVERAL REPS WERE INCLINED TO FAVOR A MORE SPECIFIC DESCRIPTION OF ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO FOLLOW-ON WORK IN SECTION IV, A GENERAL CONSENSUS EMERGED IN SUPPORT OF THE MORE GENERAL APPROACH PROPOSED BY THE US.

2. PER WASHINGTON GUIDANCE IN PARA 3, REF B, WE DISCUSSED SECTION IF OF THE REPORT WITH THE UK DELEGATION PRIOR TO THE STAFF GROUP DISCUSSIONS. THE UK FAVORED THE GENERAL APPROACH SUGGESTED BY THE US. THE UK DELEGATION ALSO INDICATED THEY EXPECTED LONDON TO MAKE AN INITIATIVE FOR A NEW STUDY OF CONVENTIONAL TECHNOLOGY AS INDICATED IN REF B, PROBABLY VIA GENERAL REMARKS AT THE NAC SUMMIT AND A MORE DETAILED PROPOSAL AT THE DPC MINISTERIAL.

3. BEGIN TEXT OF REVISED DRAFT PERMREPS REPORT:  
STUDY OF POLITICAL AND MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF  
TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS CONCERNING TACTICAL  
USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

DRAFT REPORT BY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES

I. PURPOSE  
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THIS REPORT FORWARDS THE NEW TECHNOLOGY STUDY FOR MINISTERIAL CONSIDERATION AND DISCUSSES CERTAIN ASPECTS OF POSSIBLE FOLLOW-ON WORK.

## II. BACKGROUND

2. DURING THEIR AUTUMN MEETING IN 1973, NPG MINISTERS INVITED PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES TO INITIATE A STUDY OF THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS WHICH COULD HAVE A POTENTIALLY IMPORTANT IMPACT ON THE WHOLE COMPLEX OF QUESTIONS SURROUNDING THE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THIS STUDY WAS UNDERTAKEN BY AN AD HOC TECHNOLOGY STUDY GROUP (TSG) CONSISTING OF REPRESENTATIVES FROM ALL NPG NATIONS AND THE NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES (NMAS). THE TSG IN TURN ESTABLISHED TWO SUB-GROUPS: THE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS TEAM (MIT) AND THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS TEAM (PIT), EACH OF WHICH PREPARED SEPARATE REPORTS. IN ADDITION, THE TSG, CON-

STITUTED AS THE FULL STUDY PANEL, PREPARED A FORWARDING LETTER PROVIDING COMMENTS ON THE WORK OF THE MIT AND PIT. NPG MINISTERS HELD A PRELIMINARY EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE MIT REPORT AT THE LONDON NPG MEETING. THE REMAINING PORTIONS OF THE STUDY ARE NOW COMPLETED FOR MINISTERIAL CONSIDERATION. IN OUR COMMENTS BELOW WE MAKE SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE OVERALL STUDY AND SET FORTH SOME GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS APPROPRIATE TO THE QUESTION OF THE CONDUCT OF THE FOLLOW-ON WORK ON THIS IMPORTANT SUBJECT.

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### III. OBSERVATIONS ON THE STUDY

3. WE BELIEVE THE NEW TECHNOLOGY STUDY REPRESENTS A VALUABLE CONTRIBUTION TO A GREATER UNDERSTANDING OF THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF TECHNOLOGY FOR NATO'S FUTURE DEFENSE POSTURE. THE STUDY WARRANTS CAREFUL REVIEW IN NATO, AND THEREFORE WE BELIEVE THE PIT REPORT AND THE FULL STUDY PANEL FORWARDING LETTER, WHICH WERE COMPLETED THIS SPRING, SHOULD BE GIVEN THE SAME WIDE DISTRIBUTION IN NATO ALREADY GIVEN TO THE MIT REPORT. WE HAVE NOT RESTATED THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE STUDY BECAUSE WE BELIEVE THAT IT SHOULD BE READ IN ITS ENTIRETY AS A BASIS FOR DISCUSSION BY MINISTERS.

4. THE STUDY EXAMINES ISSUES OVER A BROAD SPECTRUM OF

MILITARY AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS RANGING FROM TECHNICAL MILITARY DETAILS TO QUESTIONS OF NATO STRATEGY. WE NOTE IN PARTICULAR THAT IT COVERS NOT ONLY NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BUT ALSO CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AND SUPPORTING

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SYSTEMS. THE RANGE OF THE STUDY WAS EXPANDED BECAUSE OF THE DEPENDENCE OF BOTH CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR WARHEAD EFFECTS ON THE OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE TARGET ENGAGEMENT SEQUENCE; THAT IS, SURVEILLANCE, TARGET ACQUISITION, INFORMATION PROCESSING, COMMAND AND CONTROL, AND GUIDANCE SYSTEMS. THE RESULTS OF THE STUDY ARE SIGNIFICANT NOT ONLY BECAUSE THEY HIGHLIGHT THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR ELEMENTS OF NATO'S FORCE POSTURE, BUT ALSO BECAUSE THEY UNDERSCORE THE NEED TO APPROACH THE DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF NEW TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS IN A FULLY INTEGRATED MANNER IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE THEIR FULL BENEFIT.

5. WE NOTE THAT THE STUDY DID NOT IDENTIFY ANY IMPLICATION OR CONSIDERATION WHICH WOULD COMPEL CHANGES IN NATO'S FUNDAMENTAL STRATEGIC APPROACH OF DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE SET FORTH IN THE AGREED STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE (MC 14/3). THE PRINCIPAL SIGNIFICANCE OF NEW WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY THEREFORE APPEARS TO LIE IN ITS IMPACT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AGREED STRATEGY. IMPROVEMENTS OFFERED BY NEW WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY COULD BE SIGNIFICANT, COULD STRENGTHEN DETERRENCE, PROVIDE INCREASED WARNING TIME, AND MAKE NATO'S CONCEPT OF FLEXIBILITY IN RESPONSE AND FORWARD DEFENSE MORE CREDIBLE. AT THE SAME TIME, THE STUDY POINTS TO THE CAPABILITY OF THE WARSAW PACT ALSO TO EXPLOIT NEW TECHNOLOGY. SINCE IT APPEARS EVIDENT THAT THIS WILL OCCUR, NATO MUST CONTINUE TO DEVELOP AND TAKE ADVANTAGE OF TECHNOLOGICAL OPPORTUNITIES TO STRENGTHEN ITS DEFENSE POSTURE. WE NOTE IN PARTICULAR THE STUDY CONCLUSION THAT TO THE EXTENT NATO CAN ESTABLISH OR MAINTAIN A TECHNOLOGICAL LEAD OVER THE WARSAW PACT, ITS CAPABILITY TO IMPLEMENT NATO STRATEGY WOULD BE ENHANCED, PARTICULARLY IF THE NEW TECHNOLOGY IS DEPLOYED IN A TIMELY, INTEGRATED MANNER AND EXPLOITED IMAGINATIVELY.

6. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE CALL ATTENTION TO THE

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COMMENTS OF THE FULL STUDY PANEL RELATING TO COSTS, RATIONALIZATION, AND STANDARDIZATION, AND TO THE DILEMMA

OF QUALITY VERSUS QUANTITY. THESE ARE AREAS WHICH THE NEW TECHNOLOGY STUDY DID NOT ADDRESS IN DETAIL. NONETHELESS, WE BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE STUDY POINTS OUT THAT THERE IS NO REASON TO EXPECT NEW TECHNOLOGY WILL PERMIT A "CHEAP" SOLUTION TO NATO'S PROBLEM OF MAINTAINING A CREDIBLE AND EFFECTIVE DETERRENT AND DEFENSE POSTURE, NOR THAT NATO CAN RELY SOLELY ON QUALITY AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR QUANTITY. THESE OBSERVATIONS POINT TOWARD THE IMPORTANCE OF EXPLOITING NEW TECHNOLOGY IN A COST-EFFECTIVE MANNER THROUGH NATIONAL AND NATO PLANNING PROCESSES WHICH SERVE TO ADVANCE THE OBJECTIVES OF STANDARDIZATION, INTEROPERABILITY, TACTICS AND DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT, AND COMMON FORCE STRUCTURES.

7. WE VIEW THE WORK WHICH HAS BEEN CONDUCTED IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGY STUDY AS A STEP IN A CONTINUING PROCESS. WHILE THE TSG FOUND IT NECESSARY TO QUALIFY SOME OF ITS CONCLUSIONS, MOST OF WHICH WERE NECESSARILY GENERAL IN NATURE, DUE TO THE LIMITATIONS WHICH ARE DESCRIBED IN THE DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE STUDY, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THESE QUALIFICATIONS DETRACT FROM THE VALUE OF THE RESULTS ACHIEVED. THE ISSUES ARE COMPLEX, AND BEAR ON A BROAD RANGE OF PLANNING ACTIVITIES IN NATO. ACCORDINGLY, WE ATTACH PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO THE NEED FOR FURTHER WORK, BOTH TO EXTEND THE RESULTS OF THE NEW TECHNOLOGY STUDY, AND TO COMPLEMENT AND DRAW ON THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF VARIOUS PLANNING ACTIVITIES IN NATO OUTSIDE THE NPG

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INVOLVED IN THE FIELD OF NEW TECHNOLOGY.

IV. FOLLOW-ON WORK

8. THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PIT AND MIT, THE MOST IMPORTANT OF WHICH ARE SUMMARIZED IN THE FORWARDING LETTER OF THE FULL STUDY PANEL, POINT TOWARD FURTHER WORK, ESPECIALLY IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS:

(A) AS AN IMMEDIATE FIRST STEP, A SURVEY AND REVIEW SHOULD BE MADE OF PAST AND ON-GOING NATO STUDIES AND OTHER COMMITTEE WORK IN THE SAME BROAD AREAS AS THOSE COVERED BY THE NPG TECHNOLOGY STUDIES TO DETERMINE WHERE FOLLOW-ON EFFORT WOULD HAVE THE MOST BENEFIT AND TO ENSURE A MINIMUM DUPLICATION OF EFFORT BETWEEN NATO'S MANY EXISTING COMMITTEES.

(B) A GENERAL CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK SHOULD BE CONSTRUCTED, WITHIN WHICH THE OVERALL IMPLICATIONS OF NEW WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY FOR NATO CAN BE ASSESSED, PARTICULARLY IN THE CONFIDENTIAL

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AREAS OF TACTICS, DOCTRINES, PROCEDURES AND FORCE STRUCTURES, AND WITHIN WHICH ANY NECESSARY OR DESIRABLE CHANGES IN NATO'S PLANNING MIGHT BE DESIGNED.

(C) AN ASSESSMENT SHOULD BE PREPARED PROVIDING TECHNOLOGICAL COMPARISONS BETWEEN NATO AND WARSAW PACT SYSTEMS TO IDENTIFY THOSE AREAS OR CAPABILITIES WHEREIN WARSAW PACT OR NATO MAY ACHIEVE QUALITATIVE ADVANTAGE OVER THE OTHER.

(D) ONCE THESE PRECEDING EFFORTS BEGIN TO BEAR FRUIT, NATO SHOULD BE PREPARED TO ASSESS THE IMPLICATIONS OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES OUT TO 1990 OR 1995.

WE STRONGLY ENDORSE FURTHER WORK IN THE ABOVE AREAS AND RECOMMEND THAT MINISTERS REQUEST SUCH WORK BE DONE.

9. WE ATTACH PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CONDUCT OF FOLLOW-ON WORK IN ORDER TO ENSURE BROAD PARTICIPATION WITHIN NATO AND TO SECURE THE MAXIMUM BENEFIT FOR ALLIANCE DEFENSE PLANNING. WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE FOR MINISTERS TO TASK PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES TO ESTABLISH SPECIFIC ARRANGEMENTS FOR THIS WORK. WHILE THERE ARE VARIOUS APPROACHES THAT MIGHT BE TAKEN, WE BELIEVE THE FOLLOWING GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS WARRANT DISCUSSION AND REVIEW IN THE PROCESS

OF INITIATING FOLLOW-ON WORK:

-- CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NEW TECHNOLOGY STUDY ARE OF BROAD INTEREST TO VARIOUS NATIONAL AND NATO PLANNING ACTIVITIES WHICH CUSTOMARILY HAVE NOT BEEN INVOLVED IN NPG WORK.

-- THE TECHNOLOGY STUDY ADDRESSED THE IMPLICATIONS OF NEW WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY IN BROAD CONCEPTUAL TERMS. BUILDING ON THIS BASE, FOLLOW-ON WORK SHOULD MOVE A STEP IN THE DIRECTION OF PROVIDING RESULTS OF INCREASING CONFIDENTIAL

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DIRECT BENEFIT FOR NATIONAL AND NATO FORCE PLANNING PROCESSES.

-- MUCH OF THE NEW WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY IS RELEVANT TO BOTH CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR DEFENSE PLANNING. WHILE ASPECTS OF FOLLOW-ON WORK MIGHT BE ADDRESSED SEPARATELY, MEANS SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED WHICH ENSURE THAT THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR APPLICATIONS OF NEW WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY ARE ADEQUATELY ADDRESSED.

-- WHILE ASPECTS OF FOLLOW-ON WORK MIGHT BE UNDERTAKEN BY EXISTING NATO COMMITTEES AND BODIES, THERE CAN BE CONTINUING BENEFIT IN UTILIZING AD HOC ARRANGEMENTS INVOLVING DIRECT PARTICIPATION BY NATIONAL AUTHORITIES AND THE NMAS.

-- THE IMPORTANCE OF NWT FOR NATO SUGGESTS THE DESIRABILITY OF ESTABLISHING BROAD DIRECTION TO INTEGRATE FOLLOW-ON WORK EFFORTS. THIS WORK MIGHT CONTINUE TO BE CONDUCTED UNDER THE NPG, OR ALTERNATIVELY MIGHT BE PLACED UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE DPC, WITH APPROPRIATE CONTRIBUTIONS FROM THE NPG.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS.

10. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT MINISTERS:

- A. DISCUSS THE TECHNOLOGY STUDY;
- B. EXCHANGE VIEWS ON CONDUCT OF FOLLOW-ON WORK;

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C. AGREE TO GIVE THE PIT REPORT AND FSP (FULL STUDY  
PANEL) FORWARDING LETTER THE SAME BROAD DISTRIBUTION IN  
NATO PREVIOUSLY GIVEN TO THE MIT REPORT.

D. ENDORSE THE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FOLLOW-ON WORK IN THE  
FULL STUDY PANEL FORWARDING LETTER;

E. REQUEST THE EARLY PREPARATION OF A SURVEY OF ONGOING  
ACTIVITIES IN NATO RELATING TO NWT;

F. REQUEST PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES TO INITIATE  
ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CONDUCT OF FOLLOW-ON WORK, AND  
REPORT AT THE NEXT MINISTERIAL MEETING ON THE ACTIONS  
TAKEN. END TEXT. BENNETT

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